Israel's
secret nuclear facility,
weapons worry Egyptian experts
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CAIRO (IPS)�Finally, pictures of Dimona�Israel�s
aging nuclear reactor�have been made public.
The plant had been shrouded in secrecy. The rare
imagery, taken on July 4 by Space Imaging Corporation�s Ikonos
satellite, was recently shown on the Web site of the Federation of
American Scientists (FAS). The site exhibits more than seven overview
images of the Dimona complex and the surrounding locations, one of which
is believed to be the burial ground of low-level nuclear waste.
Nuclear experts believe this is the first time that
the public has access to data and images of Israel�s nuclear facility.
Perhaps a more important revelation, however, is what
the report described as "the most significant finding," which
is that Israel�s nuclear weapons stockpile probably consists of
between 100 to 200 nuclear weapons. This is contrary to previous reports
that Israel might possess as many as 400 nuclear bombs.
"This, again, confirms Israel�s possession of
nuclear weapons," Fawzi Hammad, former head of the Egyptian Atomic
Energy Authority said. "The most significant finding is that the
data confirms that Israel has 200 nuclear warheads, proving that Dimona
has a big inventory, even bigger than what some of the big powers may
possess," Mr. Hammad said.
Another important revelation made by the report,
according to Abdel-Gawad Emara, a member of the Egyptian Nuclear Safety
Authority, is that the reactor is aging, given that it was built in
1963, yet it continues to be the site of intensive nuclear activity,
raising concerns about its safety.
"The danger lies in the fact that the reactor is
old and has never been open to international inspection, meaning we don�t
know what�s going on in there. Therefore, it remains a suspect nuclear
threat next door," Mr. Emara said.
Sources at the FAS said the federation�s main task
is to monitor nuclear activities around the globe. They added that the
United States has always turned a blind eye to Israel�s nuclear
activity, provided it does not conduct nuclear tests.
It was precisely this point which topped the agenda
when U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson visited Egypt two months ago.
According to Mr. Hammad, Egyptian scientists and
officials urged that pressure be put on Israel to reveal its nuclear
facilities and allow international inspection.
Mr. Richardson�s response, according to Mr. Hammad,
was, "We will look into the matter."
"We demanded that the nuclear complex at Dimona,
in particular, be opened to inspection because of the threats it is
likely to pose to neighboring countries," Mr. Hammad said.
He believes the publication of the images and data on
Dimona on the FAS site is but one step towards greater transparency on
Israel�s secret nuclear activities, breaking the long-standing
information blackout.
The first ever material on Dimona was published by
the London Sunday Times in 1986 after Israeli nuclear expert,
Mordechai Vanunu, exposed his country�s nuclear secrets. This earned
him a 20-year jail sentence which he is still serving.
The FAS report also coincided with fresh allegations
about possible radioactive contamination caused by the burial of tons of
radioactive waste in a disposal area about a mile from the main Dimona
facility.
Meanwhile, Egyptian officials dismissed the
contamination reports.
Sayed Mish�al, minister of state for military
production, said that Egypt "possesses the most up-to-date
equipment for detecting any radioactive leakage" and that there is
no evidence of nuclear contamination in this country.
Despite these assurances, the FAS report has
reinforced previous perceptions of Israel posing a constant threat to
the region due to the fact that its nuclear facilities were never opened
to international inspection.
A 1999 report by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), which assesses the nuclear performance of various states,
made no mention of Israel�s failure to observe the agency�s
safeguard system.
Officials at the IAEA admit they are not operating a
fully effective and comprehensive safeguard system in Israel, as they
are in Iraq, "because the agency has no right to implement such
safeguards in Israel since Israel is not a party to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)."
"It is not the weakness of the safeguard system,
but rather a consequence of state sovereignty," Mohamed El-Baradei,
director-general of the IAEA, said. "We are not an international
nuclear police that can force its way to facilities it feels it must
visit.
"All we can do is report a case of
non-compliance to the UN Security Council which has the legal power to
make a state fulfill its obligations," he said. |